Posted by: @bart

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I felt I had to weigh in on this lovely exchange between you both.

The underlying issues are abundantly apparent and worthy of note.

After over 19 months my install continues to be informed by this shitshow. 

Policy makers could learn a lot from the systems they claim to advocate.  

To date the desperate need for change has resulted in a nonsense of immediacy.

After the £5 billion abject and systemic failure of ECO4, £17 billion for WHG will only add to the cowboys after the u bend.

This reflex response is fundamentally inefficient. Isn't meaningful debate the work of government?

The framing of "net-zero" policies as too expensive and harmful, despite public support for climate initiatives is a result of questionable leadership.

Is this not the work of journalists?

Well done @editor 

If you read the consultation recently launched by the Government you will see that Policy makers have recognised the issues and are proposing fundamentally to change how consumer protection works in the industry.  Should this have happened earlier, well of course it should.  Why didn't it? We dont know - but your 'preferred 'answer probably depends on your politics.

My point is that getting to the point where it will make a difference is inevitably a long process, sufficiently long that it wont complete in practice before we potentially have another change of Government which could well undo it.  Therefore it is foolish to rely on it and journalism wont speed it up.

Campaigning for what is already substantially underway arms those who would block it without helping those who would benefit from it.

@jamespa, I think your three questions are useful and they would make an excellent consumer checklist; and my objection is not to educating homeowners.

The finance comparison illustrates the difference really imo. Finance is hardly virtuous, but within its regulated perimeter it has a recognisable architecture with a statutory regulator, formal complaint requirements, a free independent ombudsman capable of requiring redress and a compensation scheme when an authorised firm fails.

None of those mechanisms is perfect, but there is at least supposed to be a front door.

A homeowner with a failed heat pump installation can be passed between the installer, manufacturer, MCS, consumer code, insurer, warranty provider and grant administrator. Every organisation was involved when the system was sold and certified. When the house is cold, each can explain with remarkable precision why the decisive part belongs elsewhere.

Crooks and incompetents will never disappear and consumer protection is not expected to abolish imperfect humans, but it should make poor work harder to sell, detect it sooner and prevent the entire cost of failure landing on the person least qualified to identify it.

Posted by: @editor

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The finance comparison illustrates the difference really imo. Finance is hardly virtuous, but within its regulated perimeter it has a recognisable architecture with a statutory regulator, formal complaint requirements, a free independent ombudsman capable of requiring redress and a compensation scheme when an authorised firm fails.

Well yes, except that as we see heat pump insurance, a product of the finance industry not the heat pump industry, doesn't really work (unless the householder is very persistent) notwithstanding the finance industry regulator.

Posted by: @editor

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A homeowner with a failed heat pump installation can be passed between the installer, manufacturer, MCS, consumer code, insurer, warranty provider and grant administrator.

I agree, and so apparently do the current policy makers, which is why I have responded positively to the consultation recently launched by the Government wherein a complete re-work of the consumer protection landscape is being proposed!

I think that our difference probably boils down to this.  You are, I think, arguing for

(a) something that is already underway - better consumer protection and

(b) something that is never, ever, going to happen - a construction industry without scammers

I would perhaps prefer that attention is drawn strongly and repeatedly to the fact that change in the consumer protection is already underway, give the change strong support (whilst of course pointing out any weaknesses/possible improvements), and assist customers in the mean time (whilst the necessary processes to change the consumer protection landscape work their way through to the coal face).  I havent read the book, only the title, perhaps thats what it does.

@jamespa as you rightly say they have indeed, below are some of the changes:

DESNZ has publicly stated that, pending longer-term reform, it has already strengthened direct oversight of the existing architecture.

• A new DESNZ–TrustMark Memorandum of Understanding.
• Regular formal DESNZ engagement with Certification Bodies.
• A DESNZ observer role on the TrustMark Board.
• Direct DESNZ/TrustMark work connected with ECO4/GBIS audit activity.
• A DESNZ–MCS Memorandum of Understanding.
• A DESNZ observer role on the MCS Service Company Board.
• Close Government monitoring of the redeveloped MCS scheme.
• Centralised complaints arrangements and increased use of data analytics for installer/assurance oversight.

Unfortunately in my (and many others experience) it has been very much more of the same nonsense output from these now collaborative efforts subsequent to these changes having been implemented.

But as you say it is still early days.

If you wanted more info as to how we've got to where we currently are could I recommend the following:

ECO4 Government Response (2022) —

Primary historical source for Government's policy objectives, deliberate use of PAS/TrustMark/MCS, stakeholder concerns about assurance capacity, and Government's original governance approach.

Design of ECO4 consultation / Government policy — https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/design-of-the-energy-company-obligation-eco4-2022-2026
Original policy context for ECO4's objectives and architecture.

Warm Homes Plan (January 2026) — https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/warm-homes-plan/warm-homes-plan-html
Confirms fundamental oversight reform, DESNZ–TrustMark and DESNZ–MCS MOUs, Board observer roles, Certification Body engagement and current Government oversight approach.

Reforming Consumer Protection for Home Upgrade Schemes (June 2026) — https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/reforming-consumer-protection-for-home-upgrade-schemes
Current DESNZ consultation expressly identifying weaknesses/systemic failures, fragmented oversight, unclear accountability, integrated oversight and Government-owned data proposals.

Detailed consumer-protection reform consultation — https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/reforming-consumer-protection-for-home-upgrade-schemes/reforming-consumer-protection-for-home-upgrade-schemes-consultation-document-accessible-webpage
Detailed source for reform objectives, accountability/data proposals, systemic-risk identification and closer Government control.

DESNZ Annual Report and Accounts 2025–26 — Performance Report — https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/desnz-annual-report-and-accounts-2025-to-2026/performance-report
Records departmental governance/risk/assurance work, audit/remediation, Find & Fix, dedicated programme boards, cross-scheme root-cause analysis and policy-owner accountability language.

ECO4 extension Government Response — https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/extending-the-eco4-end-date/outcome/extending-the-eco4-end-date-government-response-html
Confirms extension to 31 December 2026 partly to allow remediation of non-compliant installations and strengthened audits/independent inspections/supplier processes.

ECO4 extension statutory Explanatory Memorandum — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2026/9780348278750/pdfs/ukdsiem_9780348278750_en_001.pdf
Statutory explanatory material confirming remediation rationale and extended Ofgem compliance determination timetable.

Solid Wall Insulation Statistical Audit Results — https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/solid-wall-insulation-installed-under-eco4-and-gbis-statistical-audit-results/solid-wall-insulation-installed-under-eco4-and-gbis-statistical-audit-results
Evidence of TrustMark intelligence reaching DESNZ, Ofgem audits commissioned on DESNZ's behalf and significant EWI/IWI technical non-compliance findings.

Government action on poor-quality insulation — https://www.gov.uk/government/news/action-taken-to-protect-households-with-poor-quality-insulation
Evidence of direct Government intervention after assurance intelligence identified widespread SWI problems.

Ofgem ECO4 Scores — https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/guidance/eco4-scores
Confirms ECO4 scoring relationship to annual bill savings and HHCRO contribution.

ECO 2022–2026 Innovation Guidance — https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/energy-company-obligation-2022-2026-innovation-guidance/eco-2022-to-2026-guidance-on-applying-for-demonstration-actions-innovation-score-uplifts-and-in-situ-performance
Government source for ECO4 objectives, fuel poverty, carbon reduction and Annual Bill Savings architecture.

ECO4/GBIS Mid-Scheme Changes consultation — https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/energy-company-obligation-4-and-the-great-british-insulation-scheme-mid-scheme-changes/energy-company-obligation-4-and-the-great-british-insulation-scheme-mid-scheme-changes-consultation
Government material describing household bill-reduction outcomes and mid-scheme policy context.

ECO4/GBIS Mid-Scheme Government Response — https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/energy-company-obligation-4-and-the-great-british-insulation-scheme-mid-scheme-changes/outcome/energy-company-obligation-4-and-the-great-british-insulation-scheme-mid-scheme-changes-government-response
Relevant to continued reliance on TrustMark/PAS, Ofgem rejection clarification and the policy response to quality issues.

ECO4/GBIS Final Stage Impact Assessment — https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/energy-company-obligation-4-and-the-great-british-insulation-scheme-mid-scheme-changes/outcome/energy-company-obligation-4-and-the-great-british-insulation-scheme-mid-scheme-changes-final-stage-impact-assessment
Policy/value source for market failures, fuel poverty, energy security and carbon-reduction objectives.

Fuel Poverty Strategy — Technical Annex — https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fuel-poverty-strategy-for-england/fuel-poverty-strategy-for-england-technical-annex
Wider Government methodology demonstrating societal value-for-money analysis including carbon, health and comfort benefits.

NAO — Energy efficiency installations under ECO — https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/energy-efficiency-installations-under-the-energy-company-obligation/
Independent public audit findings on failures in design, assurance, consumer protection, information and oversight.

Public Accounts Committee report (January 2026) — https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/51210/documents/284164/default/
Parliamentary findings on fragmented oversight, risk escalation, consumer protection and DESNZ accountability.

Treasury Minute — Government response to PAC (April 2026) — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69cd35d6837d4b59e502d0d3/E03580127_CP_1522_Treasury_Minutes_62-67_web.pdf
Critical source recording Government agreement/implementation of central PAC recommendations, risk-governance arrangements, Parliamentary reporting, remediation and consumer-protection reform.

DESNZ senior-official meetings data (Oct–Dec 2025) — https://www.gov.uk/csv-preview/69bbe0ddf7b1c24d8e23ce31/DESNZ_Senior_Official_Meetings__October_to_December_2025.csv
Operational transparency source evidencing DESNZ engagement with TrustMark, MCS, UKAS, IAA and certification bodies, including CoL discussion and TrustMark Board meeting.

PAC follow-up / DESNZ evidence (December 2025) — https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/50633/documents/277523/default/
Relevant to historic TrustMark/DESNZ meetings, information flows and DESNZ engagement with constituent ECO4 cases.

Posted by: @bart

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DESNZ has publicly stated that, pending longer-term reform, it has already strengthened direct oversight of the existing architecture....

Unfortunately in my (and many others experience) it has been very much more of the same nonsense output from these now collaborative efforts subsequent to these changes having been implemented.

But as you say it is still early days.

Its clear that 'strengthening oversight 'is a stopgap measure.  Probably more a case of (a) being seen to be doing something  and (b) an opportunity to collect intelligence that will inform the long term measures, than actually in itself making much of a difference.  

Its early days and the Government consultation to which I refer  is much more radical but will take a fair time to implement, or indeed may never be fully implemented if the next government is hostile to either regulation and/or renewables.  Its worth both a read and commenting on it as its the prime opportunity we are likely to get to have any influence.  

Thanks for the long list of reading material, a minority of which I have already read or skipped through but most of which I have not read.

I am more interested in why we are where we are than how we got here.  What, for example, are the underlying policy motives, skills gaps, misunderstandings or other factors that result in the landscape we see.  Is it a result of deliberate policy choices or poor implementation of those policies.  If its the former, why were those policy choices made, what was the thought process behind them/argument for them?.  If it is the latter, why were the policies poorly implemented and is there anything that a government with the will to do something can do about it. 

In this context its worth noting that out of 80 years since the second world war, the government in power, chosen by the people, has been ideologically disposed against both regulation and expenditure by government for 52 of those years,  I don't know if that has been a contributory factor, but its at least plausible that it may be.  

@bart thank you for weighing in, and I am sorry that after 19 months your installation is still being shaped by the very shitshow we are discussing. 

I think policymakers could indeed learn something from the technology they advocate. A good heat pump system depends upon careful design, proportionate output, continuous feedback and adjustment. Policy is too often operated like an oversized boiler with maximum output, poor control, frantic cycling and surprise at the resulting waste.

(between calls)

@jamespa agreed. Look at FCA reform.

My take: we have to embrace the fact that this industry has relied upon grant schemes in order to develop and realise/address those repercussions.

The limitations of PAS/Trustmark issues were highlighted by the industry itself in 2022 and yet gov.uk had other ideas...

For the industry (as someone who is a victim of the grant scheme) I'd simply argue that the perceived distance from the consumer has created many of the outcomes we are now experiencing.

(I do get it, I didn't pay, but that doesn't mean I don't love the idea/understand/appreciate the kit as much someone who did pay)

Bottom line: Public money should be spent more frugally not less

Posted by: @bart

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My take: we have to embrace the fact that this industry has relied upon grant schemes in order to develop and realise/address those repercussions.

Of course, what do you expect, human beings are human beings ie mostly selfish, and will thus exploit any opportunity they see ruthlessly.  The skill/challenge for government is to design any intervention to reduce (you will never eliminate) unwanted exploitation.

Posted by: @bart

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The limitations of PAS/Trustmark issues were highlighted by the industry itself in 2022 and yet gov.uk had other ideas...

Indeed.  Im not sure TBH what the Government at the time was doing.  The consultation seems to suggest very strongly that the current policy makers have a more interventionist approach.

Posted by: @bart

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For the industry (as someone who is a victim of the grant scheme) I'd simply argue that the perceived distance from the consumer has created many of the outcomes we are now experiencing.

Completely agree.  The consultation currently underway makes it abundantly clear that 'consumer' in 'Consumer protection' includes/means 'resident' not just 'funder', this is an important recognition.  However I suspect that this will need to be supported by some consumer education so that consumers who are not also bill payers feel more empowered. 

The question to my mind, is how to change things and, in order that we can learn from the past and dont make similar mistakes, why are we are we where we are in terms of what are the underlying policy motives, skills gaps, misunderstandings or other factors that result in the landscape we see).  I doubt that the previous Government positively intended to spend public money badly, but somehow that was the effect.  What other decisions did it make which contributed to (or even caused) this effect? 

Posted by: @bart

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Bottom line: Public money should be spent more frugally not less

Easy to say, much more difficult to do (given human nature) if, at the same time, Government is actually to achieve anything.  The way to spend the least money is to have no government support for anything and no effective independent consumer regulation.  That's indeed what some politicians advocate and presumably why MCS was spun off to the industry in 2018 rather than retained as part of the Government machinery.

I should make it clear that nnothing I am saying detracts from the fact that I am sorry you are having the problems you are having.  If you wish to re-energise the relevant thread and summarise where you are now at maybe some further advice will be forthcoming.    

I think Bart’s experience exposes and illustrates the fundamental design error. The scheme treats the installation as the product and the funding transaction as the measure of success. Neither is correct IMO. The actual product is a warm, affordable and properly functioning home for the resident, and that’s what I argue in my book.

Once those ideas become separated, everybody can complete their assigned task while the overall outcome is dreadful. The installer fits the equipment. The certification body checks the PDFs. The grant administrator approves the payment. Government records another completed measure. Every organisation succeeds according to its own narrow definition while the resident spends 19 months living with the failure.

That does not require malicious intent. It simply requires the wrong incentives, fragmented responsibility and a success metric that stops when the money moves, and this is happening all the time, repeatedly.

@editor I agree wholeheartedly with your last post.  Of course treating the installation as the product protects the installer and much of the regulation is 'by the industry, for the industry'. The same bodies are responsible for consumer protection , so are marking their own homework.  Another issue, particularly with ECO, is treating the resident as secondary to whoever is paying.

The proposed changes to consumer protection expressly recognise that the true consumer (ie the person to whom it matters) is the resident, and expressly separate consumer protection from the industry.  Hopefully that will make a fair difference, but it's going to take time to implement and will doubtless face some serious challenges. 

Let's hope that these changes are given the time and money to work and not watered down either because of self-interested lobbying during the current consultation, or by a government of the future.

@editor Thank you for such a remarkable conclusion! (Sorry Mars, I couldn't help myself.)

But seriously, I think the central proposition behind Britain's Heat Pump Shitshow — that the real product should be a warm, affordable, properly functioning home, rather than a completed installation or funding transaction — gets remarkably close to what my own ECO4 experience has exposed.

Bizarrely, given the 1,800+ communications required in my case, much of that “product” already appears to exist within the rules. ECO4 addresses predicted bill savings, scoring, notification, monitoring and audit; MCS adds design and performance requirements; consumer law adds another layer of protection.

Yet I have six different performance predictions, apparently all produced after the works were treated as completed. They don't reconcile with one another and, on my analysis, neither adequately describe my property nor reconcile with the ECO4 submissions.

More revealing is what happens when that is challenged. Installer, Retrofit Coordinator, Certification Bodies, Scheme Providers, TrustMark, obligated supplier, Ofgem and DESNZ — yet it remains remarkably difficult to establish who actually owns the outcome when the design, promises, installation, certification and ECO4 record don't agree.

That rather proves the book's point: everyone can potentially complete their process while nobody owns the product.

And Government itself now appears to recognise that something structural has gone wrong. DESNZ has moved closer to the assurance architecture, including observer positions on the TrustMark and MCS boards, while June brought wider intervention and reform. Then July saw leadership transitions announced at both organisations — Ian Rippin at MCS and Simon Ayers at TrustMark. I make no suggestion of causation, but it is quite a period of institutional change.

The public-money point is equally important. ECO4 is a publicly mandated intervention intended to deliver social and energy outcomes. Success surely cannot mean simply that funding was released and measures recorded as completed. It has to mean that the intervention delivered what the money was intended to achieve.

Otherwise administrative completion becomes a proxy for success while the resident and the public purse carry the consequences of failure.

Perhaps the shitshow isn't that we lack rules, standards or assurance bodies. It's that nobody ultimately owns the outcome.

My experience increasingly suggests that — and I'm clearly not alone.

At the risk of going on: A slight side issue for a forum largely concerned with privately funded installations, but relevant to the wider consumer-protection picture: there has also been notable change within DESNZ itself.

Jeremy Pocklington, then Permanent Secretary, subsequently moved on after appearing before the PAC, where he accepted that ECO4 oversight had been “too fragmented” with “too many layers”.

Deborah Chittenden, the senior DESNZ official involved in the ECO4 consumer-protection and remediation response, also confirmed on 30 June that she had left DESNZ, with Nicola Higgins taking over as Director of Consumer Protection.

I suggest no causal connection, but taken alongside the July leadership changes at both TrustMark and MCS, that's quite a turnover across organisations whose standards, certification and consumer-protection functions matter to privately funded installations as well as ECO-funded ones.